While Spangdahlem is still open, many US bases in Europe have not been so lucky. There has been a spate of closures and consolidation in recent years, the result of a proactive US military base closure process that has been well underway throughout the past decade overseas.

Below is a list of some of the major base closing in Europe since 2003, by military service:

• Army: Giesssen (Germany), Hanau (Germany), Darmstad (Germany), Wuerzburg (Germany).
• Navy: Naval Air Station Keflavik (Iceland), Naval Support Activities Gaeta and La Maddalena (Italy).
• Air Force: Rhein-Main Air Base (Germany).

Nearly every member of Congress is opposed to closing bases in the United States, but most have no problem supporting a closure overseas. Indeed, claiming that overseas bases should be closed before US bases is a favorite rationale for postponing necessary closures here at home.

But this rationale is starting to run into the reality that our overseas bases have already seen significant cuts. As a recent AEI report summarized, the US Army alone has closed 100 installations in Europe since 2003 and plans on returning an additional 47 installations to host nations by 2015. The Navy has also been consolidating and shedding European bases over the last eight years. The Navy closed an air station in Iceland and Naval Support Activities Gaeta and La Maddalena in Italy. Currently, the Navy is assessing capacity of remaining bases in Spain, Italy, and Greece. Its leaders also plan to review the US Marine Corps installation in Norway. Finally, since 1990, the Air Force has reduced aircraft and forces stationed in Europe by 75%.

Still more cuts are coming to America’s overseas posture. Before he left office, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta directed the Pentagon to explore additional opportunities for consolidation in Europe. Already, DoD is planning to continue reducing the US presence in Europe by approximately 15% over the coming decade.

As the US military shrinks in size, capacity, and capability, it must also reduce its inventory of physical assets. Congress can only postpone what is an overdue domestic base closure process for so long. Budgets are simply falling too fast for the services to pay for the unnecessary operation of excess capacity, particularly as the number of active duty forces falls rapidly.

But pretending that Congress should avoid a domestic base closure round because we need to target overseas bases first simply ignores reality and the real money it is generating as a result of these savings.

By continuing to ignore the law of the land (and however lousy that may be, that’s what the Budget Control Act is), the President is doing greater damage than is necessary to the military. Last year, Pentagon leaders were directed to not plan for sequestration until it basically took effect. Using equally poor judgment, the Pentagon was allowed to overspend throughout the first half of the fiscal year on the overly optimistic assumption that Congress would provide higher dollars than ultimately transpired and that the Department would get a budget bill enacted (something that was very much in doubt until an omnibus spending measure passed).

These political decisions to let the Pentagon plan and operate outside of realistic bounds set by law seem to help the military in the near-term but are actually exacerbating ongoing damage and making the outlook worse through continued uncertainty. This hurts Pentagon leaders’ ability to best execute budget cuts when they ultimately do trickle down into planning reality and the force. This leads to overreaction, unwise choices and crisis response once the Department of Defense has a real budget.

Poor decisions like not sending an aircraft carrier to the Gulf and cutting tuition assistance for servicemembers are, in part, the result of rosy and ultimately false political calculations regarding the 2013 continuing resolution and sequester outcomes. The President’s 2014 defense budget only continues these trends and accelerates them.

The outlook for a grand bargain this year is as elusive and dubious as previous attempts. That increases the irrelevance of Obama’s 2014 defense budget request. Worse, it may actually hurt the larger fiscal debate once it heats back up this summer with the need for another debt ceiling increase. That is because sequester is still law, and the Obama budget request reflects a 10 percent growth for the Pentagon relative to those reduced levels.

By resetting the baseline, sequestration allows those who would arbitrarily cut the defense budget further to claim it is growing. This flies in the face of senior military leaders’ claims that budget cuts are hurting the force, harming readiness, and potentially hollowing out the security strategy.

Ignoring the law and the difficult decisions that come with it also allows policymakers to get off the hook for the consequences of their votes and choices. Unfortunately, President Obama’s 2014 defense budget is a recipe for continued uncertainty, additional budget cuts, an ultimately reduced strategy, and inability to safely and smartly plan for the long-term.

Secretary Hagel said all the right words for those examining the out-of-whack internal defense budget priorities. AEI recently issued a report noting how sequestration actually provides an opportunity to tackle overdue and necessary changes at the Pentagon. Many areas in need of reform have remained unchecked and experienced generous growth within the defense budget, including

• Bureaucratic overhead;
• Excess infrastructure; and
• Deferred and in-kind compensation for DoD personnel.

Many other think tanks and outside organizations have been banging the same drum, and it seems Secretary Hagel took notice.

Hagel noted that fundamental reform of these major internal cost drivers of the defense budget is required. But after discussing at length why these must be areas of targeted change, he then turned around and gave himself an out.

A big one.

Secretary Hagel noted that while he will examine these areas for reform, it may just turn out that dramatic changes could prove “unwise, untenable or politically impossible.”

Secretary Hagel gave up on making real change at the Pentagon before it even has a chance to begin. He appears to be saying that these challenges warrant scrutiny, but action is questionable at this point. This simply negates all of his reasoning and rationale for why these cost drivers must be tackled now.

Congress and the bureaucracy will surely hear this massive caveat and happily oblige. Hagel indicated in his Q&A session with the audience that the President’s 2014 budget request would likely seek to recycle many of the previously rejected proposals in these areas and attempt bigger, long-term change later (if at all).

The problem is that “later” (i.e., fiscal year 2015) kicks controversy into the mid-term election season. Once that gets underway, Secretary Hagel’s unique moment to come into office and break glass, upend tradition and promote fundamental change will be up. Let’s hope the new Secretary of Defense isn’t giving up on the need for overdue change quite so soon.

Some of this is legitimate given the size and scope of Pentagon contracting, which approaches some $400 billion annually. But plenty of it is pure politics.

Now that the nation is set to go over the fiscal cliff, the groundwork is being laid to ensure it plays out in slow motion. Many policymakers wrongly think that this will buy more time for Congress and the president to work out a deal retroactively later this spring.

In reality, the opposite is true. The longer federal agencies, small businesses, and taxpayers live on the other side of the cliff, the less urgency will exist to address the only-simmering crisis and the easier it will be to stay there permanently.

No pink slip notices by defense manufacturing companies as required by the WARN Act? No problem. This just makes politicians less aware of and less liable for the very real impact sequestration is already having across small and large businesses throughout America.

No government furloughs happening anytime soon? All the more reason to assume living in a post-cliff era is just not that bad.

No debt downgrade or negative stock market reaction in early January after no deal is reached? That will surely help solidify the perception that going off the fiscal cliff and staying put is devoid of long-term consequences for America’s economy or the politicians who let it happen.

For months, many politicians have been clearly stating that they are comfortable going over the cliff and living with a recession and other consequences that are expected to occur as a result.

There is no reason not to take them at their word. And this would include erasing hopes that a deal which couldn’t be reached over the past 18 months will magically emerge in March or April, after many policymakers have become comfortable with the cliff jump.

Under Obama, the number of missions heaped on those in uniform has not declined. Indeed, that number has not gone down under any president of either political party since the end of the Cold War. From Haiti to Bosnia to Kosovo to Iraq to Afghanistan to Libya, our forces keep getting busier.

Should we engage in these missions or shouldn’t we? This might be a worthy debate if the American people were somehow involved, but they’re constantly told otherwise: We can keep cutting the military’s budget but still magically retain a force that is second to none. At some point, getting more and spending less not only rings hollow but actually produces a hollow force.

Notwithstanding, many continue making similar claims. Earlier this week, the Center for American Progress released a new report proposing roughly $1 trillion dollars in new defense cuts over the next decade.

CAP’s basic argument is that military spending should be diluted proportionately to other elements of national power, such as diplomacy, development, and homeland security. The report categorizes military spending as offensive, drawing a contrast with diplomatic and development spending, which it calls preventative.

But this distinction is overly simplistic and misleading. American military might is rarely employed for offensive purposes. Rather, our forces spend most of their time deterring and preventing conflict through multinational exercises with allies, training foreign militaries, and being present over time to build relationships and trust.

The CAP report tries to address this by briefly discussing “environment shaping,” but argues that forward-deployed forces are an inefficient economic investment because it encourages free riding by allies that would otherwise invest in their own defense and defensive arms purchases by enemies could increase. Rather, the argument goes, the United States should become an offshore balancer, only surging into vital regions when events threaten to get out of hand.

This is the thinking that cements the alliance of America’s isolationist Libertarians and progressives. But Libertarians are more honest because they are clear that their goal is an America in retreat.

Both fail to appreciate that our presence in vital regions like the Asia-Pacific inhibits, not encourages, conflict. It’s true that under the American security umbrella there’s probably some free riding by allies. But for every dollar spent on a professional force, advanced technologies, training, or weapons, there are invisible savings gained in blood and treasure by not having to fight unnecessary wars. Or are they really suggesting we allow Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan – for instance – to succumb to Chinese predations?

There’s no question that diplomacy and foreign aid contribute important components to the preventative mission. But the military deterrent is a key element in that mix. And we have a vital stake in the peaceful resolution of disputes that may otherwise suck us into dangerous international conflicts.

America tried to be an offshore balancer twice before, and the result both times was a World War. We saved pennies and lost pounds and tens of thousands of lives in the bargain.

If we’re going to have a military, those in it need something to sail, something to fly, something to drive. Breaking contracts to buy those things to “save” money isn’t free. Flying and driving half century old equipment has its own implications. But the costs of a weak deterrent and an incapacitated military are greater still. Is defense expensive? You bet. Peace costs a great deal. Is fighting a war even more expensive? By any standard – in dollars and in blood – so much more.

Romney could have jumped in and asked why then some US Army aging networks are closer to Atari than the iPhone. But that would have only further detracted from a serious and legitimate discussion on substance.

President Obama was making an argument that really gained traction in the George W. Bush administration. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s Pentagon sought similarly to value capabilities as changing threats became more diffuse and multi-faceted.

The numbers-don’t-matter (or at least they are not that important) argument is also one that Navy leaders have been making for years as fleet goals shrink. Total fleet size today is less important than in the past, they say, because our ships are so much more capable.

Few would dispute this obvious truth in wartime, including Governor Romney. Even casual observers of the US military might understand that ships today are far more technologically advanced than a much larger American fleet forty years ago.

But Romney’s emphasis on the importance of quantity is not an argument ignoring capability. The men and women in uniform spend the vast majority of their time at home and around the world every day engaging in operations that are not hostile conflicts. Sailors regularly conduct exercises with foreign militaries to increase interoperability, airmen often help build new runways on faraway continents to enable allies, and soldiers regularly partner with local forces to build up their internal capacity—all in an effort to build relationships and prevent an outbreak of hostilities.

Our military fights and wins the nation’s battles when needed. But they are sized, built, and funded to do much more, including deterring adversaries, supporting friends and allies, influencing global events, and supporting whole-of-government and other soft power efforts.

Ships steaming the world’s oceans, docking in foreign ports, and conducting multinational exercises offer tangible demonstrations of US military engagement, power, and presence. Simply being there helps the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard maintain peace and stability around the world along with the other services. A fact overlooked by President Obama in his sound bite this week.

A Navy built to maximize presence—one designed to prevent conflict and win wars—is one that must place a greater emphasis on simple numbers. After all, ships visiting one port cannot be docked in another.

Today’s Navy already emphasizes presence, as evidenced by the unsustainable pace of global operations, deployment schedules, and commander requirements. Currently, over 100 Navy ships are deployed worldwide, or 40% of the fleet. This includes six of America’s eleven aircraft carriers stationed in areas like the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and the South China Sea. Also deployed are five of America’s amphibious assault ships, visiting ports such as Phuket, Thailand and Sepangar, Myanmar. These deployments help support combat operations in countries like Afghanistan and Libya when needed, but they more oftentimes serve to build ties with local partners, bolster key security relationships, and help maintain stability in vital areas of the globe.

Despite the increased firepower and lethality of America’s modern Navy, there is still no substitute for numbers. Seeking to have enough capability is what offers policymakers more options when they look for tools to help shape regional events and politics so that war never breaks out in the first place.

While the Navy is now quite ready to fight and win America’s wars, the most successful wars are the ones America never needs to fight. Deterrence requires presence, and presence requires numbers. This is something lost in the over-simplified comments by President Obama.

The report does, however, highlight how harmful sequestration will be across the entirety of the federal budget. Sequestration would also affect after-school programs, smaller class size efforts, and programs for children with disabilities. The number of FBI agents, customs and border patrol agents, correctional officers, and federal prosecutors would drop. The FAA would have reduced ability to manage air traffic control at the nation’s airports. The government’s ability to prevent foodborne illnesses would be curtailed and FEMA’s ability to respond to terrorist attacks or natural disasters would be undermined.

The effects on the military are also widespread. Given the administration’s exemption of the military personnel account from sequestration, the overwhelming majority of cuts fall upon two broad categories of the defense budget: Operations, training and maintenance (O&M), and modernization.

O&M pays for many day-to-day activities — everything from flying hours to fuel to the civilian workforce and health care. Reductions in this account at $27.32 billion are roughly half of the Pentagon’s sequestration cuts. This is particularly unhelpful because maintenance and training are already habitually underfunded. In fact, the report itself makes this point clear: “sequestration would result in a reduction in readiness of many non-deployed units.”  That would create an outcome the Joint Chiefs have said is a non-starter: A return to the hollow force. While the administration has indicated that it will try and avoid additional military endstrength reductions, this may be impossible. Regardless, the resulting force would be undertrained, underfunded, and underequipped for the worldwide demands placed on them daily.

Sequestration will equally damage the military’s already-anemic modernization plans. These accounts would fall by $22.79 billion, roughly 41% of DoD’s total cuts. Because cuts are calculated by percentage, the largest programs will suffer the largest reductions. Air Force and Navy aircraft procurement will both be hit by over $2 billion, and the Navy will lose an additional $2 billion from shipbuilding, for example.

Although the report does not break down cuts at the project level, numbers alone dictate that large, capital-intensive programs like the F-35, aircraft carriers, and nuclear submarines will experience major setbacks under sequestration that will cost the taxpayer much more in the long run. The great irony of sequestration — an effort designed to help reduce America’s debt load — is that it is clear it would not “save” much money, if any, to implement.

In the meantime, the defense industry, which employs over one million Americans, is left to guess just how badly its workers are going to be hit when sequestration takes effect in 2013. And the rumor mill is churning. I’m hearing that the White House budget guidance will be thin and largely lacking in new or substantive details.

If that’s the case, the president’s vagueness will likely be motivated by the same “concern” (read: politics) that led the Department of Labor to issue guidance on the WARN Act layoff notices to industry earlier this summer. Remember, the WARN Act requires defense companies to give 60 days notice to employees they’re planning to lay off. But the Labor Department, which has no jurisdiction over WARN Act notifications, decided it should issue a guidance memo to defense contractors telling them that they really weren’t required by law to notify employees of prospective layoffs… and especially not if those notices were going to go out the week before the election. Of course, it’s the federal courts, not Labor, that adjudicate whether employees’ rights have been violated.

Let’s review the bidding here: The law requires a report on sequestration plans and WARN Act notifications. The administration thinks both should be ignored. Both were put into place to help Americans workers and their families plan ahead or look for new opportunities and take advantage of state programs while still on payroll. Which is why, regardless of OMB and Labor Department obfuscation, many major defense companies are seriously weighing the possibility of issuing these layoff notices at some point in the next few months.

Wondering what the real impact is going to be? We get a look via Capitol Hill in this release from Senators McCain (R-AZ), Ayotte (R-NH), Chambliss (R-GA), Cornyn (R-TX), Graham (R-SC), Inhofe (R-OK), and Lieberman (I-CT) detailing the damaging effects of the uncertainty surrounding the outcome of sequestration that are already underway and in a series of letters to the Hill from defense contractors.

General Dynamics, EADS, Exelis, and Lockheed Martin CEOs all made clear that contracts have slowed, and the future is too unclear to make investments or hiring decisions. The key point of their correspondence is not that layoffs are coming as a result of sequestration but that thousands of jobs are going unfilled or being lost now due to uncertainty in an already fragile economy.

While Washington stalls on major budget questions, businesses are acting. EADS Chairman and CEO Sean O’Keefe said it most succinctly: “American workers are unemployed today because of the uncertainty that has been allowed to surround sequestration.” That’s today. Now imagine next year.

Congressman Ryan explicitly connected Friedberg’s theme to America’s choice today: “Our fiscal policy and our foreign policy are on a collision course; and if we fail to put our budget on a sustainable path, then we are choosing decline as a world power.”

Some analysts have highlighted how Ryan’s 2012 defense budget proposal kept President Obama’s defense budget cuts intact. And in 2013, Budget Chairman Ryan is proposing only modest increases in military spending relative to the president.

Most important in the battle over budgets, priorities, and government is not the differences between Ryan and Obama’s defense budgets but rather Mr. Ryan’s laser-like focus on the urgent need for entitlement reform. Without an honest effort at reining in costs and putting the Big 3 entitlements on more solvent footings, the debate about the shrinking defense budget will simply be overtaken by the math of America’s debt.

This is already happening. The defense budget is set to be eclipsed by interest payments on our national debt at some point in the next five years. Meanwhile, some are projecting that Medicare Part A could run out of money within the same timeframe, absent change.

Regardless of the threats facing our country, the requirements of our military, or the strategy of any administration, the defense budget will be increasingly beholden to what politicians do or not relative to automatic and growing mandatory spending on Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid—roughly two-thirds of our federal budget.

Mr. Ryan seems to be betting that the true culture war that will define America’s future is not about social issues but spending. America cannot continue to fund entitlements without reform while playing a leading role in global affairs.

By attempting to put entitlement spending on a sustainable course, Mr. Ryan is attempting to actively maintain America’s role in the world. Without reforms on the scale of what he is proposing, America will eventually be unable—and perhaps unwilling—to meet its global commitments. It is clear that Mr. Ryan’s national security credentials are indeed genuine.

This conveniently-timed guidance by Labor issued just before OMB officials testify before Congress on Wednesday is just that: election year politicking.

The WARN Act and Budget Control Act are the laws of the land that legally cannot be ignored simply because it might hurt a pol’s reelection chances. The law states that sequestration will take effect in January. Only another law will change that.

Defense contractors cannot avoid their legal obligations on the theory that a law triggering layoffs might be changed before the layoffs become necessary… any more than my employer can stop withholding my income taxes because Congress is considering reforming the tax code.

The WARN Act provides employees a right that is enforced by federal courts, not the Labor Department. Even the Labor Department admits in a WARN Act fact sheet that “it has no administrative or enforcement responsibility under WARN” and therefore “cannot provide specific advice or guidance with respect to individual situations.”

Until this week, anyway.

What’s ironic about the politics of sequestration is how the WARN Act came into law. In 1988, a Democratically-controlled Congress passed the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act with veto-proof majorities. It was heralded as a major victory for labor and workers who would now have advanced notice of mass layoffs. The idea was to provide a window for workers and their families to look for new opportunities while taking advantage of state programs while they were still on payroll. By law, firms with at least 100 full-time employees anticipating mass layoffs must provide 60 days’ notice to affected employees (some states require 90 days like California and New York).

In 2007, Democrats led by Sherrod Brown, Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton proposed the Forewarn Act, which would have strengthened the WARN Act by expanding the number of companies under the law’s jurisdiction and requiring 90 days’ notice. The bill didn’t go anywhere. Now, apparently, the president not only opposes the principles underlying legislation he himself supported, he opposes WARN entirely.