In today’s Washington Post, I lay out five disasters America will face if we retreat from Afghanistan—including the likely end of the drone war against al Qaeda in Pakistan; an increased risk that Pakistan could fall to the Islamists; the return of al Qaeda to its safe havens in Afghanistan; the emboldening of al Qaeda to carry out new attacks on America; and the strengthening of Iran in its nuclear standoff with America.
These only scratch the surface of what might befall our country if we retreat now before the mission is complete. Here are some additional consequences of an American failure in Afghanistan:
1. Tensions, and the risk of conflict, between India and Pakistan will grow. Before September 11, 2001, Pakistan was one of only three countries that recognized the Taliban regime, and the Pakistani ISI had a long history of covert cooperation with Islamic militants. After 9/11, President Bush delivered a blunt message to Pakistan’s leaders: you are either with us or with the terrorists. They chose wisely and began cooperating with the United States in the war on terror. In the ensuing years, that cooperation has deteriorated. If the U.S. retreats from Afghanistan, it would end all but completely. Those in Pakistan who were behind the policy of cooperation with the United States would be marginalized, while those who have advocated for cooperation with Islamic radicals and terrorists would be strengthened. Tensions between Pakistan and India would grow. If there were another major terrorist attack, like the 2008 Mumbai bombings, which could be traced back to Islamabad, America’s ability to influence the situation would decline. India would rightly conclude that we are not reliable partners, and had lost our ability to restrain Pakistan—increasing the chances of Indian retaliation, and the risk of war between these two nuclear powers.
2. American global prestige would take a major blow. No matter how the Obama administration tried to spin it, an American withdrawal from Afghanistan would be perceived by friend and foe alike as a retreat. And it would not be taken in isolation, but viewed in the broader context of President Obama’s dramatic cuts in defense spending, his decision to pull out of Iraq, his approach of “leading from behind” in Libya, and his failure to lead at all in Syria. All this in concert would do tremendous damage to our reputation, creating an impression of weakness that would affect U.S. security interests not only in South Asia but across the globe. Potential adversaries won’t fear us, friends and allies won’t trust us, and the fence sitters will be more nervous than ever.
3. The morale of the U.S. military would be decimated. An American retreat would allow a resurgent Taliban to regain lost territory, and they would in turn almost certainly permit al Qaeda to use that territory to restore their lost sanctuary in Afghanistan. Preventing this outcome is the mission for which nearly three thousand Americans gave their lives, and many thousands more were injured. The terrorists would not only set up training camps in Afghanistan again, they could very well use abandoned American military posts for this purpose. One can only imagine the devastating effect this would have on the morale of our Armed Forces.
4. We’d have to go back and start all over again. If Afghanistan did fall apart, the Taliban regained lost territory (or, worse yet, returned to power), and al Qaeda made a comeback in the country where they planned the 9/11 attacks, does anyone imagine for a moment that America would be able to sit back and allow this to happen? We would eventually have to go back and drive the Taliban and al Qaeda out all over again. We would expend more American lives and treasure—all to restore military gains that we had already paid for with American lives and treasure.
Bottom line: all these consequences are preventable. But preventing them requires leadership from the commander in chief. The president needs to start standing with his military commanders on the ground and give them the time and resources to implement their war plan. And he needs to use his bully pulpit to rally the American people, by explaining our strategy for success and the consequences failure. Today he is doing neither.
I beg to disagree, and on each of your points.
Regarding Pakistan: India doesn’t think we have the ability (or will) to restrain Pakistan, they know that deterring Pakistan is something they have to do themselves, and our being in Afghanistan doesn’t change that dynamic. Pakistan never really cooperated with us in the aftermath of 9/11. Whatever (limited) influence we have with Pakistan is not because they fear a military attack but rather a cut off of foreign and military aid. In other words, we already have next to no influence with Pakistan and our leaving Afghanistan changes that not in the least.
Regarding our prestige: it’s already next to non-existent (at least regarding nation building exercises). Leaving Afghanistan only confirms what is already thought. And since no matter how long we stay, we can’t ‘win’ in Afghanistan, whenever we leave it will be seen as confirmation of our lack of staying power (the same as with Iraq, and for the same reasons).
Regarding our military morale: to the contrary of your assertion, I think our guys’ morale would improve if we no longer asked them to risk their lives and limbs in a conflict that can’t be won.
Regarding the need to do it over: the mistake Bush made (in both Afghanistan and Iraq) was in sticking around after accomplishing our initial goals and trying to remake those countries into something resembling a civilized society. Going after our enemies does not require a full-on land invasion and occupation, it requires us to target and kill those enemies and in the most effective and efficient way. We simply don’t have the resources to occupy and try to rebuild each and every country where our enemies establish bases.
And finally to some of your other points: our being in Afghanistan hasn’t deterred Iran from proceeding, our leaving won’t lead to them doing anything other than what they’re already doing. Pakistan falling to the Islamists is a function of how ruthless the military is in keeping that from happening which is independent from our being or not being in Afghanistan. Our being in Afghanistan hasn’t deterred Al Qaeda from wanting to launch attacks against the US, their failure to do so is more a function of lack of talent, drone strikes and our ability to better detect (and deter) attacks in advance. And there is no shortage of places in the world for Al Qaeda to hide. Even if Afghanistan was off limits there are plenty of places they can establish themselves.
Sorry to say this Marc, as I like most of what you write, but your arguments for a continued presence in Afghanistan are so weak that I wonder if you’re so concerned about Bush’s legacy that you can’t look at the situation in an unbiased way.
Thanks Steve for your detailed rebuttal to Marc, you saved me some time. I agree the Afghanistan mission was lost as soon as Petraeous was dispatched with the COIN idiocy. Out NOW!
What Steve said.
Yes, your points are on point, but the commander in chief and his party is feckless and just doesn’t have the heart for the “endless” conflict–which is obvious to most busy Americans with limited time for reality testing. Given that: regarding point one, encourage India to nuke Pakistan and get it over with. Point two: American prestige took a blow with the failure to enforce the peace treaty ending the Vietnam War, and much of what has transpired up till today is traceable to that congressional fiasco. Nothing new. Point three: Given points one and two, there is no need for concern about point 3, and besides, the lives lost were all males. To keep the military morale up, I suggest restaffing the new military with females and gays proportional to their population percents, because most males with any balls will probably be leaving. Point 4: no, we don’t have to go back:hint, what glows in the dark in the Hindu Kush for the next thousand years?
I just read Charles Henderson’s book about the fall of Viet Nam. As the ARVN retreated ,the last few Marines (embassy guards) in Danang heard Ambassador Graham Martin say “the northern part of the country and Hue and Danang and Quang Tri City were never important to having an integral South Viet Nam. The Marines were mad as hell and said “Then why did twenty thousand of our brothers die in I Corps?”
I think Afghanistan is untameable but lots of good men bled in the fight. The jackasses in DC better have a decent explanation for these men for the war and not leave it an albatross around their necks like at the end of the Viet Nam war.
India surely is prepared for any eventuality and deal with any situation that would arise following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan.
The irony is, in the event of a war with Pakistan, India will actually fight the Americans, because Pakistani fire power against India has been underwritten by the Americans, through measured transfer of weapons and tens of billions of dollars in the garb of war on terror.
Therefore the big question for India is, would there be any change in the US policy towards Pakistan after their withdrawal from the region.
My guess is, there would be no change as far as propping up Pakistan against India is concerned, eventually exposing the hypocrisy and hollowness of the much hyped US-India strategic partnership.
“India surely is prepared for any eventuality…”
I would add that it would be crazy for India to not have done so, since everybody but the kool-aid drinkers (sorry, Marc) knew that America was going to leave Afghanistan without having truly tamed the country.
“My guess is, there would be no change as far as propping up Pakistan against India is concerned”
I disagree. Pakistan is getting propped up in large part because Washington thinks they need Pakistan’s help in Afghanistan. Once we’re out, what do we need Pakistan for? And as for the fear that, without our help, Pakistan’s nukes are at risk, I would answer that if Pakistan was interested in funneling nukes (the weapons themselves or simply the technology) to our enemies, they will do so and regardless of whether they’re getting help from the US… as was the case when they sold technology to North Korea.
If the Americans indeed would stop aiding Pakistan after their withdrawal from the region, as you have mentioned, that would be the turning point in the dynamics of a number of relations between nations, and also behavour of individual nations.
My guess is, once Pakistan is left to fend for itself and forced to deal with India on a bilateral basis, its behaviour will change for better.
The US-India partnership, which is slated for a long term and presently lacking in substance to show for, will be able to get rid of the baggage of decades of mistrust.
This will have removed a stumbling block on the way to a closer US-India relations.
I would call it a new beginning for a better world …. !
I thought the point of the mission in Afghanistan was originally:
1. Remove Al-Qaida/Bin Laden
2. Overthrow Taliban
What exactly hasn’t been accomplished?
For some reason we stayed way longer than we needed to – just like the Russians did….
The problem with each of these could-be scenarios is that current situation is a far more costly and certain disaster than any of these potentials. Yes, there could be “disasters” as a result of withdrawing from Afghanistan–but there’s greater potential for bigger disasters if we stay (e.g. a Beirut-style bomb that kills hundreds of our soldiers all at once, another Karachi naval base-style attack, etc.). Plus, as Steve pointed out below, almost all of the potential cases that Marc points towards are already happening right now even with us in Afghanistan.
There’s no shame in recognizing the that cost-benefit analysis–even in the longer term future with all the reputation effects that Marc worries about–favors leaving Afghanistan as quickly as possible.
I agree with Steve. Further, I would withdraw all of our ground forces from the entire region. Left to their own devises our enemies will be happy to fight among themselves, as they always do. Why should we place our troops in between the tribes? Let the Sunni kill the Shiite and so forth and so on. At most, a few dollars in bribes should keep the tribes stirred up and out of our hair. Besides, bombs are expensive. Why should I subsidize the killing of Muslims when the Muslim’s neighbor will kill him for free?